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Reconciling the Lanham Act and the 
FDCA: A Comment on Chris Hurley’s 
Note 
Christopher B. Seaman* 
I. Introduction 
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola,1 the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously2 held that a claim for false or misleading 
advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act3 was not 
preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act4 (FDCA) 
simply because the allegedly false or misleading beverage label at 
issue—which prominently displayed the words “pomegranate 
blueberry” despite containing less than a thimbleful of either 
pomegranate juice or blueberry juice5—fell within the scope of the 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulatory authority under 
the FDCA.6 Rather, the Court concluded that the Lanham Act and 
the FDCA “complement each other in major respects” because 
“[a]though both statutes touch on food and beverage labeling,” they 
serve different objectives, as “the Lanham Act protects commercial 
interest against unfair competition, while the FDCA protects 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law and Director, Frances Lewis Law Center, 
Washington and Lee University School of Law. My thanks to Chris Hurley and 
the Editorial Board of the Washington and Lee Law Review for inviting me to 
participate in the 2017 Notes Colloquium, and my sincere gratitude for their 
patience with the submission and editing of this Comment. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
 2. The decision in POM Wonderful was 8-0; Justice Breyer took no part in 
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 2242. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301–399h). 
 5. Specifically, Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid juice blend contained only 0.3% 
pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice by volume. POM Wonderful, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2233. 
 6. Id. at 2233, 2237–42. 
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public health and safety.”7 Furthermore, it explained that the two 
statutes’ remedial schemes are complementary as well, as the FDA 
possesses the technical knowledge needed to regulate the health 
and safety of various consumer products, but it lacks “the expertise 
in accessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors 
possess.”8 In contrast, the Lanham Act “draws upon this market 
expertise by empowering private parties to sue competitors” for 
market harm caused by false advertising.9 
In particular, the Court’s opinion distinguished between food 
and beverage labels and other products that are more heavily 
regulated by the FDA, noting that the FDA did not preapprove 
juice labels, in contrast with other types of labels, such as 
prescription drugs.10 This has led both commentators11 and 
courts12 to question whether POM Wonderful’s holding is limited 
and does not extend to other products, such as pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices, which are more heavily regulated by the FDA 
and require preapproval. To date, however, there has been little 
discussion of an important related issue: whether a drug maker’s 
promotion of a FDA-approved drug for a non-approved condition, 
which is commonly known as “off-label use,” also can be subject to 
claims of false or misleading advertising or promotion under 
Section 43(a).13 
                                                                                                     
 7. Id. at 2238. 
 8. Id. at 2238–39. 
 9. Id. at 2238. 
 10. See id. at 2235 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) and noting “the less extensive 
role the FDA plays in the regulation of food than in the regulation of drugs”). 
 11. See, e.g., Peter Meier & Elizabeth Dorsi, Limiting Lanham Act Claims 
after POM Wonderful, ABA SEC. LITIG. (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/fall2014
-1214-limiting-lanham-act-claims-food-and-drug-products-after-pom-
wonderful.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (“One question left unresolved by POM 
Wonderful is the extent to which its holding applies to drugs regulated by the 
FDA, as opposed to just food and beverages.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 12. See, e.g., JHP Pharms., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999 
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that, in POM Wonderful, “the Court suggests a 
difference between food labeling, which is not subject to FDA pre-approval, and 
drug labeling, which is,” but ultimately declining to resolve this issue because the 
plaintiff’s complaint did not adequately plead facts sufficient to plausibly 
demonstrate false or misleading labeling). 
 13. In an important Comment, Kathryn Bi has addressed the issue of what 
constitutes false or misleading advertising or promotion of off-label uses of drugs, 
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Fortunately, we have Chris Hurley, who fills this important 
gap in the literature with his award-winning Note. In particular, 
Mr. Hurley’s Note addresses the difficult question of reconciling 
the language of two complex statutes, as well as the competing 
public policy concerns at play: (1) ensuring the safety and efficacy 
of pharmaceutical drugs through evidence-based regulation, and 
(2) preserving the ability of physicians and patients to access 
information about potentially beneficial non-approved uses of such 
drugs. Ultimately, Mr. Hurley argues the Court’s decision in POM 
Wonderful should extend to off-label advertising and promotion 
that is false or misleading, thus allowing claims against drug 
makers under Section 43(a) for such conduct.14 As described 
further below, while I agree with the Note’s main thesis—I 
similarly would conclude that a Section 43(a) claim against false 
or misleading statements related to off-label promotion is not 
preempted by the FDCA—I also contend that courts should be 
cautious in determining what constituted “false or 
misleading . . . advertising or promotion” regarding off-label use, 
for fear of chilling the dissemination of valuable information about 
potentially efficacious but unapproved uses of FDA-authorized 
drugs. 
The remainder of this Comment proceeds as follows. Part I 
addresses the issue of “off-label” promotion and explains why 
off-label use of drugs are both common and beneficial in the 
practice of modern medicine, but also can be problematic. Part II 
covers false and misleading advertising under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, including past cases where courts permitted claims 
involving the promotion of regulated pharmaceutical products to 
go forward despite the FDA’s extensive regulatory process for 
approving for such products under the FDCA. Part III analyzes 
how the Lanham Act and the FDCA can be reconciled in the 
                                                                                                     
but it only briefly touches on the POM Wonderful decision and its potential impact 
with no substantive analysis of the potential preemption issue. See Kathryn Bi, 
Comment, What is “False or Misleading” Off-Label Promotion?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
975, 989–90 (2015) (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decision in POM 
Wonderful . . . eliminated a substantial source of legal uncertainty for prospective 
plaintiffs and is likely to encourage such private-party suits in the future”). 
 14. See Christopher A. Hurley, Note, The Off-Label Use of POM Wonderful: 
Using Section 43(a) to Eliminate Misleading Off-Label Drug Promotion, 75 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 593, 632 (2018) (“Applying POM Wonderful, then, neither the FDCA 
nor its accompanying FDA regulations should bar Section 43(a) claims.”).  
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context of off-label uses of FDA-approved drugs, including the role 
of physicians as intermediaries in determining whether a 
particular off-label use is medically appropriate. It then concludes 
with a few final thoughts regarding the quality and thoughtfulness 
of Mr. Hurley’s Note. 
II. What are Off-Label Uses, and Why are They Important? 
As a threshold matter, it is important to address what 
constitutes an “off-label use” of an FDA-approved drug and why 
such uses are important. As previously mentioned, the FDA is a 
federal regulatory agency that is part of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services.15 The FDA’s primary mission is to 
protect the American public through the regulation of numerous 
products and services, including but not limited to, drugs, medical 
devices, vaccines, biologics, food, beverages, dietary supplements, 
cosmetics, radiation-emitting products, and tobacco products.16 
Within the FDA, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) evaluates the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs 
through pre-market approval and post-market regulation.17 
                                                                                                     
 15. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(a) (2012) (“There is established in the Department of 
Health and Human Services the Food and Drug Administration . . . .”); see also 
HHS Organizational Chart, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/orgchart/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2018) (listing the FDA as part of HHS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b); see also About FDA: What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo (last updated Dec. 29, 2017) 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2018)  
The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the 
public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human 
and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by 
ensuring the safety of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products 
that emit radiation. FDA also has responsibility for regulating the 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products to 
protect the public health and to reduce tobacco use by minors. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedical 
ProductsandTobacco/CDER/default.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2014) (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2018)  
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) performs an 
essential public health task by making sure that safe and effective 
RECONCILING THE LANHAM ACT AND THE FDCA 651 
Pre-market approval is a rigorous process with several stages. 
First, a product sponsor (i.e., a pharmaceutical company) must 
submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the 
FDA.18 If approved for investigation, the drug goes through three 
phases of clinical trials to evaluate safety, dosing, efficacy, and 
adverse reaction (side effects).19 The final stage, Phase III, is the 
most rigorous, typically lasting multiple years and involving 
thousands of subjects (patients).20 After clinical trials are 
complete, the company files a New Drug Application (NDA), which 
the FDA investigates with the assistance of physicians and 
scientists from various disciplines and sub-disciplines, including 
pharmacologists, statisticians, and medical officers.21 If approved, 
FDA also considers what information must be included on the 
drug’s label, such as dosing information and warnings about 
                                                                                                     
drugs are available to improve the health of people in the United 
States. As part of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
CDER regulates over-the-counter and prescription drugs, including 
biological therapeutics and generic drugs.  
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2017) (“Investigational new drug means a new 
drug or biological drug that is used in a clinical investigation.”); id. § 312.20(a) 
(“A sponsor shall submit an [investigational new drug application] to FDA if the 
sponsor intends to conduct a clinical investigation with an investigational new 
drug.”). 
 19. These clinical trials are known as Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III. 
Id. §§ 312.21(a)–(c). 
 20. Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm (last updated 
Jan. 4, 2018) (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also Kyle D. Ross et al., Drug Use, Access, and the Role of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A PRIMER 
FOR PHARMACISTS 141, 150 tbl. 5-1 (Robert L. McCarthy et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012) 
(stating that Phase III clinical trials have a length of 3–4 years and involve 
between 2000–3000 patients in clinical settings). 
 21. New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeveloped 
andApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last 
updated Mar. 29, 2016) (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Earlene E. Lipowski & Marcus Long, Government 
Involvement in Healthcare (“The drug developer files a new drug application 
(NDA) after it completes Phase III trials with the drug. The FDA reviews a 
summary of results from all clinical trials and the procedures planned for the 
drug’s manufacture, formulation, and quality control.”), in INTRODUCTION TO 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A PRIMER FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 20, at 401, 413. 
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potential side effects.22 The median time from start of clinical trial 
to FDA approval is approximately eight years.23 The process of 
drug approval is also incredibly expensive. According to a recent 
study by researchers at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug 
Development, the average industry cost of new prescription drugs 
(including failed applications) is over $2.5 billion, and only 12% of 
drugs that enter clinical trials are eventually approved.24 In short, 
the drug approval process is costly, lengthy, and uncertain. 
Once a drug is approved, physicians are generally free to 
prescribe it without restriction. But in order to market the drug 
(“promotion” in FDA lingo), the pharmaceutical company must 
have obtained approval for a particular use.25 Prescription for a 
condition other than the ones approved by the FDA is called an 
“off-label” use.26  
There are numerous reasons why a drug may be prescribed 
off-label. First, pharmaceutical companies may not believe it is 
cost-effective to apply for FDA approval via a supplemental drug 
application for additional uses.27 This may occur, for example, if 
                                                                                                     
 22. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (explaining the requirements governing 
labels for drugs, including warnings regarding adverse reactions). 
 23. Thomas J. Hwang et al., The FDA’s Expedited Programs and Clinical 
Development Times for Novel Therapeutics, 2012-2016, 318 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 
2137, 2137 (2017). 
 24. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 25–26 (2016). 
 25. See Michael Ollove, Pressure mounts to lift FDA restrictions on off-label 
drugs, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
health-science/pressure-mounts-to-lift-fda-restrictions-on-off-label-drugs/2017/10/06/ 
568204a0-a2f6-11e7-8cfe-d5b912fabc99_story.html?utm_ term=.c5a78f297441 (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2018) (“[F]or decades drugmakers have been barred from 
promoting their drugs for uses that hadn’t gone through clinical trials.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their 
Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC. PROC. 982, 982 (2012) (“The 
most common form of [off-label drug use] involves prescribing currently available 
and marketed medications but for an indication that has never received Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Hence, the specific use is ‘off-label’ (ie, not 
approved by the FDA and not listed in FDA-required drug-labeling 
information).”). 
 27. See id. at 985  
Obtaining a new FDA approval for a medication can be costly and time-
consuming. To add additional indications for an already approved 
medication requires the proprietor to file a supplemental drug 
application, and, even if eventually approved, revenues for the new 
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the off-label use is to treat a rare condition with few patients 
(called “orphan conditions”).28 Second, if the drug in question has 
become generic by falling outside of patent protection, it may lack 
a corporate sponsor to bear the required expenses of the FDA 
approval process because, if successful, other companies can “free 
ride” off the approval because the sponsoring firm lacks 
exclusivity.29 Third, off-label use may occur when the condition is 
otherwise likely to be untreatable (i.e., last-resort therapy), or 
when there is emerging but not yet conclusive evidence of 
effectiveness.30 These types of treatments “can provide valuable 
data about the effects of the drug for different conditions and 
populations,” which “can then be used to inform future clinical 
practice.”31  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that off-label uses of 
FDA-approved drugs is widespread. A 2006 study based on 
nationally representative prescribing data found that 
approximately 21% of all drugs were prescribed off label.32 One of 
the most common off-label uses was for cardiac medications, 
representing nearly half (46%) of all prescriptions for these 
drugs.33 Another frequent off-label use is for psychiatric disorders 
(approximately 40% according to one study), where existing 
medications may not be effective for certain patients or may have 
                                                                                                     
indication may not offset the expense and effort of obtaining approval. 
 28. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the 
Role of the FDA, 358 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (explaining that off-label 
uses “can provide the only available treatments for ‘orphan’ conditions”); see also 
Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 989 (“Orphan drugs are medications that are 
developed and used for rare, or orphan, diseases. Owing to a drug’s limited clinical 
use for an orphan indication, it will typically generate insufficient profitability for 
the drug’s sponsor to seek FDA approval for the narrow indication.”). 
 29. Stafford, supra note 28, at 1427; see also Henry Grabowski, Patents, 
Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849, 851 (2002) 
(“Absent patent protection, or some equivalent barrier, imitators could free ride 
on . . . FDA approval and duplicate the compound for a small fraction of the 
originator’s costs.”). 
 30. See Stafford, supra note 28, at 1427 (noting that “off-label use 
includes . . . last-resort therapy” and that it permits “physicians to adopt new 
practices based on emerging evidence”). 
 31. Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for 
Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 390 (2014). 
 32. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based 
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006). 
 33. Id. 
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substantial negative side effects.34 Off-label use is also common for 
advanced-stage cancer where other treatments have failed; by one 
estimate, one-half to three-quarters of all drugs used in 
chemotherapy were prescribed off label.35 Finally, pediatric 
applications of drugs are another area where off-label use is 
frequent, in part because the drugs that are effective in adults are 
often effective in children as well, but for safety reasons clinical 
trials are not feasible.36 In sum, off-label uses of approved drugs 
are common and may be beneficial,37 but they also carry potential 
risks, including lack of efficacy and potentially serious side 
effects.38  
III. Section 43(a) and Claims of False or Misleading Advertising 
Involving FDA-Approved Drugs Before POM Wonderful 
This Comment will now turn to Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. Congress’s purpose in enacting the Lanham Act was, inter 
alia, “to regulate commerce within the control of Congress” by 
“prevent[ing] fraud and deception.”39 Although the Lanham Act is 
                                                                                                     
 34. Darshan Kharadi et al., Off-Label Drug Use in Psychiatry Outpatient 
Department: A Prospective Study at a Tertiary Care Teaching Hospital, 6 J. BASIC 
& CLINICAL PHARMACY 45, 46 (2015). 
 35. C. Daniel Mullins et al., Recommendations for Clinical Trials of 
Off-Label Drugs Used to Treat Advanced-Stage Cancer, 30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 
661, 661 (2012) (citing Michael Soares, “Off-Label” Indications for Oncology Drug 
Use and Drug Compendia: History and Current Status, 1 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 102, 
104 (2005)). 
 36. See generally, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: 
Off-Label Uses of Drugs in Children, 133 PEDIATRICS 563 (2014); Jennifer Corny 
et al., Unlicensed and Off-Label Drug Use in Children Before and After Pediatric 
Governmental Initiatives, 20 J. PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 316 
(2015). Congress has passed legislation, including the Best Pharmaceuticals for 
Children Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 876, and the Pediatric 
Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936, to help address 
this issue. 
 37. See Bi, supra note 13, at 983 (“[O]ff-label prescriptions can have tangible 
public health benefits—the medical community considers some off-label uses to 
be ‘state of the art’ procedures for treating certain conditions.”). 
 38. See Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off Label Prescribing: A Call for 
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 
476 (2009) (“Off-label prescribing is an integral part of contemporary 
medicine . . . . Off-label prescribing can also harm patients, however.”). 
 39. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 
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best known as the federal law governing trademarks,40 
Section 43(a) sweeps significantly broader by creating a federal 
remedy against unfair competition.41 Specifically, Section 43(a) 
prohibits and creates a civil cause of action against: 
[A]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or 
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description 
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial 
activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents 
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of 
his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial 
activities . . . .42  
Initially, Section 43(a) was narrowly interpreted “as 
forbidding only ‘passing-off,’ or the infringement or unauthorized 
use of a trademark.”43 Indeed, Judge Charles Edward Clark of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—a former Dean of 
Yale Law School—noted in a concurring opinion a decade after the 
Lanham Act’s enactment that Section 43(a) was an “extensive 
                                                                                                     
(2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012)). 
 40. See Overview of Trademark Law, https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/ 
fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (“Trademarks are governed by 
both state and federal law. . . . The main federal statute is the Lanham Act, which 
was enacted in 1946 . . . . Today, federal law provides the main, and by and large 
the most extensive, source of trademark protection . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 41. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should 
Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 672 (1984) 
(noting that “Section 43(a) is . . . a major weapon in the fight against ‘unfair 
competition”); J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is 
Now Wide Awake, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 45 (1996) (“Today, section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act is the preeminent federal law for asserting claims in private 
litigation against two distinct types of ‘unfair competition’ . . . .”). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
 43. Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A 
Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 59–
60 (1996). 
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provision covering the false description or representation of goods 
introduced into commerce,” but lamented that “there is indication 
here and elsewhere that the bar has not yet realized [its] potential 
impact.”44 But over time, “through case law interpretation and in 
some times erratic spurts of growth, Section 43(a) began to fulfill 
the role” as “the primary source of private remedies against several 
important types of unfair competition.”45 As Professor J. Thomas 
McCarthy has explained, “by the 1980s, Section 43(a) had become 
a much-used and potent statute” to combat multiple forms of 
unfair competition, including false or misleading statements in the 
advertising and promotion of goods.46 
Notably, there are numerous examples of cases brought under 
Section 43(a) regarding alleged false or misleading advertising 
about FDA-regulated drugs prior to POM Wonderful that were not 
found to be preempted. For example, in McNeilab, Inc. v. American 
Home Products Corp.,47 McNeilab, Inc. (McNeil), the manufacturer 
of Tylenol, sued American Home Products (AHP), the maker of 
competing product Advil, under Section 43(a) regarding AHP 
commercials which claimed Advil did not cause stomach upset as 
a side effect more frequently than Tylenol.48 The District Court 
granted McNeil a preliminary injunction against AHP based in 
part on survey evidence,49 which was affirmed on appeal by the 
Second Circuit.50 There was no assertion that the FDCA 
preempted McNeil’s Section 43(a) claim, even though both Advil 
and Tylenol are FDA-regulated over-the-counter (OTC) drugs.  
                                                                                                     
 44. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 
(2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 45. McCarthy, supra note 41, at 51. 
 46. Id. at 52. 
 47. 848 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 48. Id. at 35. This was preceded by an earlier lawsuit by AHP against 
McNeil, which alleged that McNeil had engaged in false advertising under 
Section 43(a) by disseminating to physicians a safety profile that visually 
compared ibuprofen to aspirin and “suggest[ed] that ibuprofen shared aspirin’s 
high propensity to irritate the stomach.” Id. at 36. McNeil counterclaimed, 
alleging that AHP’s advertising campaign concealed Advil’s side effects. Id. At 
trial, the district court held that both parties had violated Section 43(a) and 
enjoined a variety of their advertising. Id. (citing Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 49. Id. at 37 (citing McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 
819 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 50. Id. at 37–39. 
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Similarly, in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Cosprophar, 
Inc.,51 the FDA approved the plaintiff’s prescription drug, Retin-A, 
for treating acne.52 After its approval, the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, a leading medical publication, published an 
article by researchers who discovered that the active ingredient in 
Retin-A (tretinoin) was also effective in treating photodamaged 
skin from sun exposure.53 In the wake of this publicity, 
prescriptions for off-label use of Retin-A increased dramatically.54 
Cosprophar then began marketing a skin cream with an 
advertisement asserting that it contained a chemical which 
“belonged to the same family” as Retin-A and compared the two 
products’ side effects in an allegedly misleading manner.55 Ortho 
Pharmaceutical then sued Cosprophar, asserting that its 
advertisements were false or misleading under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act. Although the District Court ultimately dismissed 
Ortho’s complaint because it could not prove competitive injury 
and thus lacked standing, which was affirmed by the Second 
Circuit on appeal,56 neither court held that plaintiff’s claims were 
preempted despite the involvement of an FDA-regulated drug.  
In addition, there are several cases where lower federal courts 
rejected claims of preemption over the manufacturing and 
marketing of “knock-off” drugs prior to POM Wonderful.57 For 
instance, in Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Breckenridge 
Pharmaceutical, Inc.,58 the district court held that defendant’s 
claim that its product was bioequivalent to plaintiff’s prescription 
drug was actionable under Section 43(a) and not preempted under 
                                                                                                     
 51. 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 52. Id. at 692. 
 53. Id. (referring to Jonathan S. Weiss et al., Topical Tretinoin Improves 
Photoaged Skin: A Double-Blind Vehicle-Controlled Study, 259 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
527 (1988)). 
 54. See id. (according to plaintiff’s own estimate, nearly half of Retin-A’s 
sales were for off-label use). 
 55. Id. at 692–93. 
 56. Id. at 694–97. 
 57. See generally Solvay Pharms., Inc., v. Glob. Pharms., 298 F. Supp. 2d 880 
(D. Minn. 2004).  
 58. 388 F. Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Wis. 2005). 
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the FDCA.59 Likewise, in Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari,60 the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
plaintiff’s Section 43(a) claim that defendant had falsely alleged 
that its drug was bioequivalent to plaintiff’s.61  
Despite this body of case law, Congress has failed to amend 
Section 43(a) to expressly exclude claims for regulated drugs under 
the FDCA, despite enacting numerous other changes to the 
Lanham Act since the mid-1980s (including amendments to other 
parts of Section 43).62 As a result, Congress’s failure to amend 
either the Lanham Act or the FDCA to overturn these decisions 
and expressly preempt Section 43(a) claims involving advertising 
for FDA-regulated drugs means that Congress has likely 
acquiesced in allowing such claims. Under the so-called 
“acquiescence rule,” “if Congress does not overturn a judicial or 
administrative interpretation it probably acquiesces in it.”63 As the 
Supreme Court explained in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,64 “[t]he 
long time failure of Congress to alter [a statute] after it had been 
judicially construed . . . is persuasive of legislative recognition that 
the judicial construction is the correct one.”65 The acquiescence 
rule thus provides further support for Mr. Hurley’s thesis that the 
FDCA does not preempt Section 43(a) claims regarding advertising 
and promotion of off-label uses.  
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 973–75. 
 60. 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 61. Id. at 1137–38. 
 62. See generally, e.g., Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
667, 102 Stat. 3935; Federal Trademark Revision Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 
120 Stat. 1730; Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, Pub. L. 107-273, 116 Stat. 
1758 (2002); Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 
1730 (2006); Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property 
Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act), Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256. 
 63. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 68, 69 (1988). 
 64. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
 65. Id. at 488–89; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) 
(“Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decision to stand for so long 
and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not 
to approve of them legislatively.”). 
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IV. Reconciling Section 43(a) and the FDCA Regarding 
Promotion of Off-Label Uses 
In short, I agree with the primary thesis in Mr. Hurley’s Note 
that claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act regarding 
off-label uses of drugs are not barred as a matter of law, based in 
part on the history of such claims prior to POM Wonderful as 
described in the previous section, as well as the analysis in POM 
Wonderful itself that explains how the two statutes are 
complementary rather than competing in their objective to prevent 
false or misleading statements regarding FDA-regulated products. 
For policy reasons, however, I recommend that courts tread with 
some caution in this area, as an overly-broad reading of what 
constitutes false or misleading advertising may chill the 
dissemination of valuable information by a drug maker regarding 
potentially life-saving off-label uses. 
Some claims regarding off-label use would clearly run afoul of 
Section 43(a). For instance, an allegation that a drug has been 
approved by the FDA to treat a certain condition, when it has not 
in fact been so approved, would clearly be a false statement that 
violates Section 43(a). Similarly, if a drug maker claims that an 
FDA-approved drug is efficacious for treating another, unapproved 
condition, but then-existing clinical data in the medical literature 
does not support this claim, then it would likely be false or 
misleading under Section 43(a).66  
Other assertions, however, may present a more difficult case. 
For instance, the FDA defines “misbranding” under the FDCA as 
any promotion by drug makers of an off-label use.67 But this sort 
of “misbranding” does not necessarily involve false or misleading 
statements under Section 43(a). For example, if a reliable 
post-approval study or trial found that a drug was efficacious and 
safe for treating an unapproved condition, the maker of the drug 
should be able to communicate that result to physicians.68 To hold 
                                                                                                     
 66. See generally Bi, supra note 13, at 1015–18.   
 67. See Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 988 (“[T]he FDA prohibits 
‘misbranding’ of medications. Misbranding includes labeling a medication with 
misleading information, including off-label uses.”). 
 68. The 1997 FDA Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, 
provides support for this outcome, as it “allow[s] manufacturers to distribute to 
health care providers peer-reviewed journal articles about unapproved uses of 
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otherwise would limit the ability of drug companies to disseminate 
important information. 
Furthermore, there is an important difference between a 
Section 43(a) claim of a false or misleading statement—which 
generally involves advertising aimed to an ordinary consumer—
and promotion of an off-label use of an approved drug, which are 
typically directed at highly-trained and educated physicians. To 
borrow a term from tort law, these physicians operate as “learned 
intermediaries”69 who can use the information provided by drug 
makers to exercise their professional judgment about whether to 
prescribe an off-label use for their patients.70  
V. Conclusion 
Despite these modest qualifications, Mr. Hurley’s Note is a 
model of student scholarship—it rigorously addresses a timely, 
important, and difficult problem; it demonstrates a deep 
understanding of multiple intersecting areas of law; it takes a 
normative position on the dispute; and it supports that position 
with both legal authority and well-reasoned argument.71 Future 
                                                                                                     
medications.” Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 988. The FDA also revised its 
guidelines in 2009 to allow distribution of off-label use by pharmaceutical firms if 
specific regulations were followed. Id.; see also Bi, supra note 13, at 983 
(explaining the “scientific-exchange exception to the general bar on off-label 
speech” “permit[s] drugmakers and physicians to communicate the underlying 
science about off-label uses”). 
 69. The learned intermediary doctrine is a defense to a product liability 
claim, wherein a manufacturer of a product can discharge its duty to warn 
consumers by communicating such information to a learned third party, such as 
a physician. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998); see also Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule 
for the New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 196 (2004) 
(explaining that under the learned intermediary doctrine, “the mere fact that a 
prescription drug is at issue in a failure-to-warn case automatically vitiates the 
manufacturer’s duty to warn the end user of dangers posed by the product” with 
only a few limited exceptions). 
 70 .See Bi, supra note 13, at 1008 (“[T]he audience for an off-label claim 
should . . . include any medical professional who makes prescribing decisions.”).  
 71. See also Christopher B. Seaman, Comment, Comment on “Groove is in 
the Hart”: A Workable Solution for Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games, 
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 407 (2015) (praising another Note as “an excellent 
piece of student scholarship—it is clearly written, well organized, and makes a 
valuable contribution to the resolution of a difficult problem that has perplexed 
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Law Review staffwriters working on their own Notes would do well 
to carefully study what Mr. Hurley has done and emulate it in their 
own scholarship. 
                                                                                                     
courts and scholars alike for decades”). 
